Tuesday, December 20, 2022

Why Turgenev Remains One of the Most Important Russian Writers (And Why You Should Read the Constance Garnett ... - Literary Hub - Translation

1.

The English novel at the end of the 19th century had a problem, and that problem was French.

Emile Zola had thrown the first stone. In his 1875 manifesto, Le Roman Experimental, the prominent French novelist insisted that in order to survive the industrial age the novel would have to turn away from the charms of Romanticism, and towards a more pragmatic, if somewhat less compelling muse: the scientific method.

Zola’s inspiration for this change was the physiologist Claude Bernard, whose “Introduction a L’Etude de la Medecine Experimental” (1865) lobbed the then-revolutionary suggestion that medicine should stop trying to understand itself as an art. In this way, Bernard said, the practice could separate itself from those folk traditions that had guided it for centuries, working its way towards those underlying principles without which “we have only groping and empiricism.”

Zola believed that fiction should do the same. Instead of plucking its characters from the author’s imagination, it should select them from real life; instead of cooking up fantastical plots, it should chart its subjects’ interactions with the disinterest of a technician watching a petri dish. The results would be brutal, but invigorating. “We teach the bitter science of life, the uncompromising lesson of the real,” he said, sounding a little like Morpheus telling Neo to stare through the matrix.

To younger writers like Flaubert, Maupassant and Daudet, however, such pitilessness was a natural evolution from the adventurousness displayed by their great Romantic progenitor, Victor Hugo: a freedom which had been liberating at one point, but developed over the years into a “huge oak,” in whose shadow, as Zola put it, “it seems impossible that any new tree should grow.”

[pullquotes]“This House deplores the rapid spread of demoralizing literature…”[/pullquotes]

The reception to all this across the Channel was dramatic, to say the least. Shaken by the depth charge of Darwinian theory, and unburdened by a genre-dominating like Hugo, the British press jumped on “Naturalism” (as Zola called it) with a mixture of hand-wringing and old-fashioned Francophobia. “[T]he banishing from human life of all that gives it glory and honor: the victory of fact over principle, of mechanism over imagination[…] in a word of matter over mind,” wailed W.S. Lilley, in a survey of the Naturalist novel published in the Fortnightly Review in 1885.

The vitriol frothed into politics in 1888, when the House of Commons carried a motion stating that “this House deplores the rapid spread of demoralizing literature, and is of the opinion that the law against indecent publications and pictures should be enforced, and if necessary strengthened.”

In 1888, an organization known as the National Vigilance Association brought an action against Henry Vizetelly, at that point the main publisher of French Naturalist novels in England, under the claim that he was “trafficking in pornographic literature.” When the NVA repeated this claim in 1889, Vizetelly was sentenced to three months in prison.

2.

As hysterical as it may sound today, one of the things that becomes clear about the British reaction to French Naturalism when we look at it in hindsight is that it was not just about preventing schoolgirls from reading about brothels. On the contrary, it was, at bottom, a literary argument.

Stripped of outrage, its main criticism was that in making the novel more “scientific” Zola had robbed it of the moral dimension that was such a key part of its appeal. He had misunderstood the central feature of the novel form—that is, its Quixotic mixing of both reality and romance—as a bug, rather than a feature. In doing so, he had paradoxically made the novel less real, producing works that, for all their brilliant depiction of the inhuman processes gripping modern life, lost sight of the human being at the center of those processes.

It is against the backdrop of this insufficiency, I think, that we can understand the passion for Russian literature that gripped England at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. As a publishing phenomenon, the so-called Russian fever, as it was known at the time, was dramatic enough to suggest the satisfaction of some need going unmet by native products—the Victorian equivalent to the Latin Boom of the mid-20th century. Certainly there were other factors that contributed.

After being regarded for centuries as a combination boogeyman/country cousin, Russia during that time had entered a period of unprecedented change, capturing the world’s imagination in a way that would have seemed unlikely only a few generations earlier. English readers wanted to know all about it: its culture, its history, its politics. More than that, they wanted to read about it, not just in newspapers, but in the newly-translated novels that, to their immense gratification, seemed to be offering them exactly the kind of course correction that they had been missing since the French Naturalists took the genre to task.

Turgenev managed the trick that the French had not, framing the changes going on in the world of the late 19th century in a way that did not simply sweep the old ways under the rug.

Perhaps no other author of the 19th century demonstrates the hand-and-glove nature of the Russian fever better than the earliest and most successful of its imports, Ivan Turgenev. As the first Russian novelist to be widely translated, Turgenev received a surprisingly smooth reception in English—except, of course, when it came to his name.

“Ivan Tourqueneff,” was how the Scotsman spelled it, in an early mention in 1870—although to be fair even this elaboration paled in comparison to the attempt that George Moore made when he lamented in an 1896 letter to his brother that his recently published novel Evelyn Innes was “inferior to Tourgournoff.” Later, Moore revised his spelling to the slightly-less-bizarre “Turgueneff,” whom he went on to praise:

“[H]e is not the ferocious cynic who, having drunk and found gall, would spit gall into every cup within reach; he is a man who, having learned the lesson thoroughly well, knowing we must live, since Nature has so willed it, is inclined towards kindness and pity; who would say ‘Obey Nature’s laws, be simple and obey; it is the best that you can do.’”

Moore’s capitalized “Nature” makes his subtext clear: here, at last, was the answer that British literature had been waiting for, a writer capable of squaring the Naturalist circle with a deftness that could make even the most careful Gallic craftsman jealous. Clearly such a writer understood the forces that humanity had unleashed on itself; at the same time, according to Moore, Turgenev managed the trick that the French had not, framing the changes going on in the world of the late 19th century in a way that did not simply sweep the old ways embarrassedly under the rug.

Perhaps just as importantly, his ironic, highly-nuanced fiction inhabited, in a way that no other work of the day seemed capable of doing, a political/literary sweet spot, one that allowed its readers to feel like they were engaging with the difficult social problems of their age, although without being unduly threatened by them.

3.

In order to understand how Turgenev managed to do this—that is, how he satisfied the seemingly incompatible demands for comfort and challenge that the late Victorian brought to the novel, like a child demanding that a bedtime story both keep them interested and put them to sleep—I think it’s useful to think about another titanic figure of the era, one whose shaping influence on the English-language reception of Russian literature has been, for the most part, misunderstood.

It’s become conventional wisdom to talk about Constance Garnett, the indefatigable ex-Fabian whose translations of the major Russian authors during the Russian fever were so persuasive that she became a sort of surrogate author for many of her readers (Joseph Conrad: “Turgenev for me is Constance Garnett, and Constance Garnett is Turgenev”), as a well-intentioned but essentially butterfingered plodder, whose lack of fluency in Russian caused her to gloss over those subtleties that might have challenged her essentially risk-averse audience.

There is some truth to this, especially when it comes to Garnett’s later work on more shaggily heteroglossic authors like Dostoevsky or Gogol; but in her translations of Turgenev Garnett caught her author’s accent perfectly, preserving those suggestive dimensions that other translations have typically sacrificed, presumably in order to bring Turgenev closer to the authoritative fluency that most readers expect a “great” writer to display.

As the critic Rachel May has noted, such streamlining is unfortunately pretty typical of translations from Russian, a language whose comparatively late literary flowering has meant that its great works in prose often imitate oral storytelling, and whose novels therefore tend to treat the narrative voice as a character in and of itself, signaling biases, emotions, or hypocrisies via tics that may strike the English translator as redundant. Taken on their own, such touches might seem trivial; but added up over the course of an entire work their removal creates atmospheric shifts that can alter the reader’s experience of the work. In certain cases, it can even change its meaning, diminishing the formal innovation underpinning Turgenev’s complex social critique.

My point in contrasting the two translations here is not to scold the Slater-Pasternak Slater version for altering the original, but to highlight how much these changes alter Turgenev’s meaning.

The costs of such misunderstanding become usefully glaring when we look at Garnett’s translation of Fathers and Children, which is not just her masterpiece but one of the translation high points of the era. It’s a book that, despite frequent period clunkiness, is extremely effective at communicating Turgenev’s superpower as a writer, that is, his ability to use the protean, inherently spoken nature of Russian storytelling to suggest the myriad smaller, subjective worlds eddying within the current of any story, no matter how glossily straightforward it might at first appear to be.

It starts doing this in its very first page, on which Turgenev introduces us to two men, the landowner Nikolai Petrovich Kirsanov, and his servant Piotr, who are waiting for a carriage to bring the former’s beloved son back to the family estate. While they wait, the scene’s crisp introductory dialogue gives way to a single two-page paragraph of backstory about Nikolai Petrovich—one whose jumbled first-this-happened-then-this-happened inelegance does a lot to characterize the landowner himself as a disorganized, if essentially sincere man.

The effect is reproduced well both by Garnett and in the more recent translation done by Nicolas Pasternak Slater and Maya Slater (New York Review of Books, 2022); but then immediately after this paragraph the narrative snaps out of Nikolai Petrovich’s consciousness and into a sentence description of Piotr’s situation, which differs in the two versions:

“The servant—out of a sense of propriety, or perhaps not wanting to remain under his master’s eye—went out to the courtyard gate to smoke a pipe.” (Slater-Pasternak Slater)

“The servant, from a feeling of propriety, and perhaps, too, not anxious to remain under the master’s eye, had gone to the gate, and was smoking a pipe.” (Garnett)

Staring at these two sentences side by side can feel a bit like examining a “Spot the Difference” puzzle in a kids’ magazine; but if we allow our eyes to unfocus a little, what stands up, I think, is primarily the different relationship that they suggest between the narrative voice and the interior world of Piotr.

In the first version, Slater and Pasternak Slater keep their distance, cordoning the servant’s subjective experience off from the rest of the sentence with a pair of dashes, and inserting the possessive pronoun “his” in a way that makes it clear that it is the author himself who is describing Piotr here.

In the Garnett version, on the other hand, the border between narrator and narratee blurs, making the description seem less objective than like a flash of ventriloquism allowing us to overhear what might be Piotr’s own reference to Nikolai Petrovich (“the master”). For a brief second, it even feels like the servant’s own thinking might have inserted itself into the narrative, usurping the description in a way that emphasizes the openness of Turgenev’s own phrase (pod barskim glazom, which in a literal translation might be “beneath master’s eye”).

My point in contrasting the two translations here is not to scold the Slater-Pasternak Slater version for altering the original (it does, of course, but so do all translations), but to highlight how much these changes alter Turgenev’s meaning, turning a daring technical extension of the third-person’s traditional objectivity into just another passage of description. In doing so, they dampen what is the main point of the sentence in the original Russian: to contrast Nikolai Petrovich’s charming but essentially indulgent self-presentation with the less obviously-significant world of his manservant, and to make us “see” Piotr’s subjective world in a way that Nikolai Petrovich himself, for the most part, does not.

We may wonder which audience is more discomfited by the radical sympathies of Turgenev’s prose: the Victorians, or us?

That a pair of 21st-century translators can make the same mistake may seem ironic; but to my mind it only highlights the immense subtlety of Turgenev’s accomplishment—and, by extension, Garnett’s reinvention of it. Speculating on what might have contributed to her sensitivity, a number of possible elements come to mind. Her Victorian British awareness of social hierarchies? Her Fabian sympathies for the working class? The fact that she was a woman? Whatever it was (or whatever combination it was), examining the translations themselves we see that over and over again her successes stem from a dogged and often somewhat awkward-sounding literalness, as if she were anxiously trying to reproduce Turgenev’s Russian sentences using exactly the same syntax and punctuation as the original.

Interestingly enough, these reproductions often convey exactly the kind of subjective tint that more naturalized versions leave out. In a brief passage in the fourth chapter, for example, the manservant Prokofyich takes the overcoat of the young Arkady’s “nihilist” friend, Bazarov: a piece of clothing that Bazarov himself refers to using the informal and self-deprecating term odyozhenka, instead of the more customary shinyel. The peculiar word choice is characteristic of Bazarov, who cares little for conventions, linguistic or otherwise; but it leads to a parenthetical reaction by the old servant that, again, comes off differently depending on which translation we are reading:

“(Prokofyich, with an astonished look, picked up Bazarov’s garment in both hands, raised it high above his head, and tiptoed out of the room).” (Slater-Pasternak Slater)

“(Prokofitch, with an air of perplexity, picked up Bazarov’s ‘garment’ in both hands, and holding it high above his head, tiptoed out of the room).” (Garnett)

As with the earlier example, the most glaring alteration that the Slater-Pasternak Slater translation make here—removing the quotation marks around the word “garment”—distorts the original, draining the moment of its comedy and making Prokofyich’s little joke seem like the twitching of a water bug. It observes the old man’s gesture from a distance, missing once again the way that Turgenev’s ungovernable attention leaps over both the straightforward anonymity of traditional third person and the more controlled ironies of free indirect discourse.

Garnett, on the other hand, preserves Turgenev’s joke and his sympathy, creating a sentence that is unwieldy but in its own way far more representative of the original. The change is one of texture, atmosphere, tone; a small change, in other words. And yet the difference in final effect is enormous—so much so that we may wonder which audience is more discomfited by the radical sympathies of Turgenev’s prose: the Victorians, or us?

The comparison may feel uncomfortable, especially when we consider that so many of Turgenev’s narrative extensions involve members of less-privileged social classes—although we should point out that members of the nobility are also granted glimpses of interiority in Fathers and Children, many of which are similarly glossed over in the Slater-Pasternak Slater translation.

In one scene, for example, the foppish uncle of the Kirsanov family, Pavel Petrovich, is given his own chapter of backstory: a tale of lost love whose compressed, slightly parodic tone reflects our understanding of him as a man rendered ridiculous by his devotion to foreign models. But even within the framework of this critique, Turgenev lets the uncle’s own voice burst through in moments of vivid pettishness.

“On his return from abroad, he had gone to visit his brother with the idea of spending a couple of months with him to admire his happiness, but he only stayed a week.” (Slater-Pasternak Slater)

“When he came back from abroad, he had gone to him with the intention of staying a couple months with him, in sympathetic enjoyment of his happiness, but he had only succeeded in standing a week of it.” (Garnett)

Torqued as it is around a series of astute prioritizations, Slater-Pasternak Slater’s version of this sentence reads undeniably as cleaner, neater, “more natural”—as better, in other words, at least until the final clause, where it replaces Turgenev’s shaded vyzhil (“survived”) with the simpler, unshaded “stayed.”

Garnett’s version, on the other hand, bumbles along in what can only be described as fastidious translatorese, sticking the landing, improbably, with “he only succeeded in standing”—a phrase whose ventilation of Pavel Petrovich’s annoyance clues us in to the fact that what we are reading here is in fact a motley monologue rumbling closer and closer to the inner, not at all objective thoughts of its subject.

This sense is key to our understanding of the next, culminating paragraph in the chapter, where we get a sentence that again bifurcates depending on which translation we are reading. “This time was harder for Pavel Petrovich than for another man; in losing his past, he lost everything,” Garnett’s version reads, articulating Pavel Petrovich’s suffering while at the same time hinting at the reserves of complacent self-pity running underneath it.

In the Slater-Pasternak Slater version, on the other hand (“This was a time more difficult for Pavel Pavlovich than for anyone else…”), the comically-aggrandizing tone of the first clause is localized and therefore muted, transforming what in the original is a rich act of self-justification into a confusing mixture of registers. For a second, we are not sure exactly who is speaking—for by removing so many of the animating asides leading up to this sentence, the Slater-Pasternak Slater translation has actually made it harder for us to follow the shifts of narrative perspective that a moment like this relies on for its effect. It has trained us to expect the kind of straightforward, lacerating, written irony that Flaubert uses in his portrait of Monsieur Homais, say, as opposed to the much more self-contradictory, storytelling inhabitations deployed by that same author when it comes to Madame Bovary herself. In doing so, it has transformed what in the Russian is a moment of rich ambiguity into one of floundering non-commitment—as if, in its inability to decide whose side it is on, the story itself has been forced to admit that it has no idea what Pavel Petrovich’s story means.

4.

Confusing though they can be, the blurrings of the Slater-Pasternak Slater translation of Fathers and Children at least remind us of Turgenev’s great strength, that is, its ability to both make and suspend its judgment, holding condemnation and compassion together—often in the same sentence. It is this combination, more than any tameness of subject matter, that sets Turgenev apart from his Naturalist competitors.

Zola flays mercilessly, or forgives totally; but Turgenev flays and forgives at the same time, satisfying our sense of reality while making us feel that the entropic tragedy of things is a kind of fate, meaning something unavoidable. In this way, his vaunted progressive message is only half the story, since it is delivered against the backdrop of a world that is inherently compromised and broken, and whose injustices we are therefore tempted to understand (in Robert Frost’s phrase) as matters of “grief,” instead of “grievance.”

It is not difficult to see why such a world might have felt comforting to the mostly educated and upper class reading public of Garnett’s time. For these readers, to quote May, “Turgenev’s art had everything to which the late Victorians aspired”—meaning, I think, not just consciously coveted aesthetic values like “simplicity,” “naturalness,” or “impeccable beauty,” but also the aquifer-like calmness from which these virtues seemed to derive.

You could argue that the best part of 20th- and 21st-century Russian and Eastern European writing would be unthinkable without the narrative “spokenness” that Fathers and Children smuggled into 19th-century fiction.

For despite all its concern with political questions like rural poverty or the freeing of the serfs, what the Victorian reader (and, yes, translator) appeared to value most highly in Turgenev’s fiction was its feeling of permanence—as if there at least, in the hinterlands of this underdeveloped, terminally-unbalanced country, the messy but ultimately stalemated drama of human existence was still being staged the same way it always had been, like a mystery play whose actors changed but whose plot remained boringly, blessedly intact.

It is a view of Turgenev, and indeed of Russian literature as a whole, that has endured in the Anglophone world almost entirely intact, rearing up again in everyone from Hemingway to George Steiner to James Wood (an interesting, non-English-speaking variant appears in the work of the Marxist critic Gyorgy Lukacs, whose interpretation of Russian literature as an unceasing road to revolution inverts the Victorian pastoral while essentially keeping its wish-fulfilling structure intact).

And yet it makes sense that, in trying to create a version of the writer for our own age, translators like Slater-Pasternak Slater might prefer to turn away from this equivocal Turgenev, dampening those formal aspects of his that qualify and complicate his social critique, and streamlining his shaggy narrative voice into something that sounds more clean-cut and incisive. After all, if there’s one thing that our current historical has suggested, it is that clarity of moral vision trumps all, or should, especially when it comes to the kind of hypocritical complacency that Turgenev’s prose, for all its clear-eyed acuity, suggests is just another ineradicable part of human nature.

Still, reading Garnett’s version Fathers and Children side by side with its cleaner update, I can’t help thinking how influential Turgenev’s example has continued to prove over the years. In an era where so much prose depends on either well-worn confessional antics, or the familiar ironies of a comfortably-ensconced narrator, it may sound out of step to suggest that Turgenev’s flexible, storytelling voice can sound like anything less than antique; and yet, taking a step back from English-language literature, we find that a huge amount of the best contemporary writing derives from exactly the kind of imaginary inhabitation that he pioneered.

Indeed, you could argue that the best part of 20th- and 21st-century Russian and Eastern European writing—in particular, in the inventive hybrid works of Svetlana Alexievich, Lyudmilla Ulitskaya, Olga Tokarczuk, and Tatyana Tolstaya (to name only four)—would be unthinkable without the narrative “spokenness” that Fathers and Children smuggled into 19th-century fiction. Add the vast, still-undertranslated body of skaz literature and “Village prose” from the Russia of the 20th century, and you have a veritable mirror-universe of contemporary literature—one in which the subtle but tenacious boundaries separating first and third person, narrator and subject, and even reader and writer, are all put thrillingly in play.

Such playful challenging seems to have felt more hospitable to the Victorian landowner steeped in Dickens and Sterne than it does to us; and yet at the end of the day, it is the atmosphere of ethical and imaginative evenhandedness created by his formal innovation that remains the most enduring aspect of Turgenev’s legacy. This is the real “permanence” of his writing, a breadth that moves beyond simple whataboutism and into a troubled laying bare of human intractability that still, despite all its anguish, cannot help but delight in the individual’s need to escape the common fate, whatever that fate may be.

Fathers and Children understands, like few other books of its time, that this is a problem—maybe the problem. But what really sets it apart is its clear-eyed insistence that there are no isolated solutions to it, and that therefore our only hope—if it is a hope—is to accept the uncomfortable fact that, despite our private arrangements, we are in the world together.

Josh Billings

Adblock test (Why?)

Monday, December 19, 2022

Opinion: The 5 Top Words Of 2022 And What They Reveal About Us - NDTV.com - Dictionary

The dictionary makers have been busy. They've been sleuthing and selecting the words that were on people's minds in 2022. This piece considers five words that made it to the 'creamy layer' (a phrase we in India recognize with some political excitement but that does not seem to carry the same connotation in the rest of the world) of English usage: permacrisis (Collins Dictionary); woman (Dictionary.com); goblin mode (Oxford Dictionary); gaslighting (Merriam Webster) and homer (Cambridge). I want to suggest that there exists an underlying affinity between these words, even though the choices were made by different bodies of lexicographers. Before we get to this possible shared ground, we should, however, acknowledge the obvious.

Word choices like these are not without bias since they've been made by powerful Western publishers on the basis of online searches for words in the English language alone. It goes without saying that such technologically driven procedures, although 'transparent', have the effect of rendering more or less invisible the vocabulary and views of the users of almost 7,000 languages. They are a stark reminder of existing power inequalities between languages. Rough estimates suggest that the top 10% or so of individuals command almost 90% of global wealth as of now. Similarly, we might say that about 90% languages are spoken by 10% of poor populations while the power languages of the world (English, Chinese, Spanish etc.) are spoken by 90% - with many more clamouring to get into these elite language clubs.

Incipient critiques of such 'language elitism' are apparent in efforts by world bodies like UNESCO that ceremoniously marked 13 December 2022 (during the same period that the words of the year for 2022 were being announced), as "the International Decade of Indigenous Languages (2022-2032)". The UNESCO's push to "highlight a 10-year action plan to draw the world's attention to the critical loss of indigenous languages and the urgent need to preserve, revitalize and celebrate them" is a measure of how desperate the situation is globally. Whether or not this august organisation succeeds in its aims is a much more complicated matter of language economies. This essay will not get into this complex terrain - or its implications for the plurilingual scenarios in our Indian states. It will desist from asking what India's own realistic action plan - minus the usual rhetorical flourishes - is in this regard. That discussion is for another day, as is an assessment of the roles played by increasingly efficient algorithmic devices such as 'Google Translate' or the online emendations made to one's lame prose by Grammarly and other arbiters of linguistic 'correctness'. Suffice it to say that we cannot underestimate the effect of these radical digital technologies on how we reassess relations between language groups, and inter alia, among ourselves, in this troubled century.

Languages today are leaking into and 'leaning into' one another in an unprecedented manner. One can, for example, routinely type in sentences on an English keyboard and see them transformed in seconds into familiar scripts such as Hindi or Tamil. Never before has the world witnessed such effortless and fast transitions and translations from one language into another. Shakespeare's Puck once boasted that he could "put a girdle round the earth in forty minutes". Today we can achieve this intellectual feat in minutes, even seconds. So what's not to like?

That notion of 'liking', made so indispensable on the Internet by the easy electronic counting of 'likes' on YouTube, Instagram, Twitter and Tik-Tok, makes it hard today to imagine a world not bound together by criss-crossing chains of 'likes'. By 'liking' a comment or a website, one performs a communitarian action; one 'links' oneself to others across the globe, creating new hybrid identities. Some linguistic cousins of 'like' are: 'alike', 'likeable' and 'dislike'. With the help of these 'like-minded' concepts, let's now look briefly at the ways in which the five words of the year 2022 mirror us and our diverse 21st century selves. 

A good example of such a global convergence of perspectives is the causal chain that enabled the unlikely word 'homer' to climb to the top of the Cambridge Dictionary verbal charts. I think it's a fair conjecture that before this word cropped up on the game Wordle (which I must admit I stay up religiously to play each night), few had heard of the common noun 'homer', even if they were familiar with the Greek epic poet Homer or the cartoon character Homer Simpson. But the rush by Wordle enthusiasts to discover the meaning of this word ensured that it 'spiked' in people's imaginations: 'homer', we found out, was to hit a homerun in baseball; it was also an ancient Hebrew measure. Who would have guessed?

Then there is that ubiquitous word woman, permanently etched into our species memories. Dictionary.com explain their choice thus: "Our selection of woman ... reflects how the intersection of gender, identity and language dominates the current cultural conversation and shapes much of our work as a dictionary." Apparently, when asked to define this keyword, the US Supreme Court Judge, Ketanji Brown-Jackson, straightforwardly admitted that she could not, so frangible has this age-old word become in our times. Notably, a close runner-up in the dictionary races was the acronym 'LGBTQIA', once again reflective of the rainbow-hued colouring of the concept of gender, once assumed to be divisible into two homogenized 'unlike' black-and-white boxes.

'Permacrisis', the word chosen by Collins, indicating "an extended period of instability and insecurity", also points to a psychic fracturing of our self-images. It reflects our shared global anxieties concerning threats of war, invasive viruses, rising costs of living and deepening political polarization. A kind of 'no-escape' scenario is summoned up by this word where, trapped in a space one deeply dislikes and fears, one is permanently assailed by feelings of helplessness and mistrust. 

Which bring us to our next word, gaslighting, picked by Merriam Webster, that also focuses on trust issues. It refers to "the act or practice of grossly misleading someone... In this use, the word is at home with other terms relating to modern forms of... manipulation, such as fake news, deepfake, and artificial intelligence." Merriam-Webster continues, tongue firmly in cheek: "In recent years, with the vast increase in channels and technologies used to mislead, gaslighting has become the favoured word for the perception of deception. This is why (trust us!) it has earned its place as our Word of the Year." 

Finally, there is the Oxford Dictionary's 'goblin mode' - "a slang term" that "represents a type of behaviour which is unapologetically self-indulgent, lazy, slovenly, or greedy, typically in a way that rejects social norms or expectations." Many of us would agree that the severe isolation that Covid brought in its wake resulted in an image-makeover - and not a flattering one. Alone at home, we became far more careless and sloppy about our appearances, more prone to reject social pressures. Our self-images and how we were perceived by others separated, became masked.

Do these five seemingly disparate words really share common ground, as I've claimed? Well, what struck me at once about this little cluster was that it, rather surprisingly, beat out the 'technical competition' from virtual words like metaverse, Web3, NFT, crypto and so on. Instead, five cognitive features appeared to stand out, linked by the profound theme of human vulnerability. These dictionaries may have used technical methods to make their choice but they were guided, in the last resort, by human 'thumbs on the scale', a sentient audience. Hence, to a greater of lesser degree, they are all: 

a. familiar 'natural kind' words indicative of a palpable humanness (woman) 

b. related to the embodied actions of a single human being who can somehow cause whole communities to collectively experience joy or despair at a 'home-run' (homer)

c. a record of changes in human self-perception that can disregard the pressure to conform to social norms (goblin mode)

d. connected to the establishment of bonds of trust or cordons of mistrust based on a distinctive human ability: namely, verbal communication (gaslighting) 

e. associated with major historical events (e.g. the war in Ukraine; racism in the United states), resulting in various interlocking forms of psychological anxiety (permancrisis)

In this sense, whether we 'like' these five-fingered offerings or not, they handily indicate that even at our loneliest, we are never quite alone.

Rukmini Bhaya Nair is a linguist and poet. She is Honorary Professor at the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi (IITD) and Global Professorial Fellow at the Department of Languages, Linguistics and Film at Queen Mary University of London (QMUL). 

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author.

Featured Video Of The Day

"Same-Sex Relationships Okay, Not Same-Sex Marriages": BJP's Sushil Modi

Adblock test (Why?)

Cambridge Dictionary changes definition of 'man' and 'woman': '1984 wasn't supposed to be a how-to manual' - Fox News - Dictionary

Cambridge Dictionary is being criticized by conservatives on social media for altering the definitions of the words "man" and "woman" to include people who identify as a gender other than their biological sex. 

The definition of woman, which previously represented the longstanding view on sex, now states that a woman is "an adult who lives and identifies as female though they may have been said to have a different sex at birth."

Similarly, a man is now defined as "an adult who lives and identifies as male though they may have been said to have a different sex at birth."

This change was met with pushback from many, who argued that redefining society's categorization of gender and sex is harmful and inaccurate. 

BIDEN INVITES ANTI-POLICE NONBINARY DRAG QUEEN TO WHITE HOUSE: ‘F--- THE POLICE’

Demonstrators protest in support of rights for transgender youth.

Demonstrators protest in support of rights for transgender youth. (Fox News )

"Cambridge Dictionary just dropped a new definition of ‘woman’," Christopher Rufo, a fellow at the Manhattan Institute, tweeted. 

Rufo also pointed out that the dictionary used the pronoun "they" to describe the subject rather than "she". 

"Notice that the dictionary writers say ‘*they* may have been.’ They couldn't bring themselves to write 'she may have been,' because they know they're lying. That's the tell," he tweeted.

"Ceding linguistic territory to the radical Left. What could go wrong?" conservative commentator Rita Panahi wrote.

MULTIPLE STATES CRACK DOWN ON TRANSGENDER TREATMENTS FOR MINORS AMID GROWING LEGAL DEBATE

A protester voices support for the promotion of transgender ideology in schools during a pro-transgender march.

A protester voices support for the promotion of transgender ideology in schools during a pro-transgender march. (Mark Kerrison/In Pictures via Getty Images)

Daily Caller writer Mary Rooke wrote, "F-ing traitors to the truth. Cambridge Dictionary is only the latest. If we don’t stop them from erasing women our civilization is [not going to make it]."

Adam Brooks, a British social commentator, questioned whether women are happy with the change.

"Oh wow, the @CambridgeWords dictionary definition of a woman is shocking, how did we get here? Surely women aren’t happy with this?" he wrote. 

Dan McLaughin, a senior writer at National Review, argued the change is Orwellian. "1984 wasn't supposed to be a how-to manual," he tweeted.

President of Judicial Watch Tom Fitton tweeted, "War on women, update…" 

Trans woman Lia Thomas prepares to swim the women's 500-yard freestyle final at the NCAA swimming and diving championships

Trans woman Lia Thomas prepares to swim the women's 500-yard freestyle final at the NCAA swimming and diving championships (AP Photo/John Bazemore)

CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP

Cambridge Dictionary's alteration of the words "woman" and "man" reflect a growing trend on the left to reject the once universally accepted usage of those categories. In April, Fox News published a report that highlighted numerous Biden administration agencies' failure to be able to answer the question: "What is a woman?". 

Adblock test (Why?)

I Speak Fluent 'New Social Media CEO Who's In Over Their Head'; Let Me Translate The Last Few Days Of Twitter Policy - Techdirt - Translation

from the the-pathetic-autocrat-edition dept

The last few days on Twitter have been, well, chaotic, I guess? Beyond the blocking of the ElonJet account, followed by the blocking of the @JoinMastodon account, then the blocking of journalists asking about all this and the silly made up defense of it, over the weekend, Twitter announced a new policy banning linking to or even displaying usernames on a whole host of other social media platforms:

The new “promotion of alternative social platforms policy,” which was quite obviously hastily crafted, said that “Twitter will no longer allow free promotion of specific social media platforms on Twitter.” It said that “at both the Tweet level and the account level, we will remove any free promotion of prohibited 3rd-party social media platforms, such as linking out … to any of the below platforms on Twitter, or providing your handle without a URL.

The “prohibited platforms” list had some odd inclusions, and even odder exclusions:

  • Facebook, Instagram, Mastodon, Truth Social, Tribel, Post and Nostr
  • 3rd-party social media link aggregators such as linktr.ee, lnk.bio

This is… desperate? Silly?

But it also raised questions. Where was TikTok? Or YouTube? Or Gab? Or Parler? Or a bunch of other small new wannabes? You could say they’re too small, but then again, he included Nostr, a social media protocol that is brand new and has basically zero features. I have personally been playing with it, but I think only about 500 people are currently using it. Maybe. Probably fewer.

Of course, as usual, Musk’s biggest fans immediately started crafting silly breathless defenses of how this was totally consistent with Musk’s claims of bringing his “free speech absolutism” to the platform. Most of these defenses were pathetic. Perhaps none more so than his mother’s.

That’s Elon’s mom saying that his new proposal “makes absolute sense” because “when I give a talk for a corporation, I don’t promote other corporations. If I did, I would be fired on the spot and never booked again? Is that hard to understand?”

I mean, that is not hard to understand, but it’s also not an accurate description of the scenario. The people using Twitter are not paid to give talks “for Twitter.” And, if that were the standard, then, um, that wouldn’t just justify Twitter’s old practices of banning accounts for lots of things that any company would fire you for saying during a “company talk,” but actually make you wonder why Twitter didn’t ban a hell of a lot more people.

But, of course, that’s not the standard. Or the scenario.

And then, of course, a few hours later, Musk (facing pretty loud criticism of this latest policy change) appeared to do an about-face, though you’d have to be following him closely to actually realize it. First he defended it, saying “Twitter should be easy to use, but no more relentless free advertising of competitors. No traditional publisher allows this and neither will Twitter.”

Except that’s also not true. First of all, every other social media platform absolutely allows accounts to link to alternative social media. Second, even “traditional publishers” frequently will link to accounts on alternative social media and they will also (not always, but increasingly) acknowledge competing media providers.

Then he made it more vague saying “casually sharing occasional links is fine, but no more relentless advertising of competitors for free, which is absurd in the extreme.”

Which is not a reasonable policy. Because how does anyone know when they’ve cross that line? Either way, as anyone who works in this space knows, if you have a vague policy like “casually sharing occasional links is fine” while the written policy says no links, you’re going to end up in ridiculous situations, such as when famed startup investor/Musk fan/pontificator Paul Graham pointed out that the policy was so dumb he was leaving for Mastodon… and promptly got banned, leading Musk to promise to have the account restored.

Eventually, in a reply to an account known for posting nonsense conspiracy theories, Musk said that the “policy will be adjusted to suspending accounts only when that account’s *primary* purpose is promotion of competitors, which essentially falls under the no spam rule.”

After that, he posted a poll asking whether he should step down as CEO of Twitter. He lost, 57.5% to 42.5% (though as I’m writing, he’s not said anything further on the results, but I full expect that he’s going to shove someone else into the role while still owning and controlling the company).

The TwitterSafety account also ran a poll asking “should we have a policy preventing the creation of or use of existing accounts for the main purpose of advertising other social media platforms”, and while the poll still has a few hours left as I write this, it seems people are almost universally against it:

So, despite Elon arguing that not having such a policy is “absurd in the extreme” and his mother insisting that such a policy “makes absolute sense,” the “vox populi” on Twitter disagrees.

Why is he doing all this? What is going on?

It seems that I have a bit of experience understanding how new social media CEOs who come in on a wave of “bringing free speech back!” promises end up running the social media content moderation learning curve. Thus, I thought it might be useful to explain the basic thought process that normally one goes through here, and that likely created each of these results. It’s basically the same as how Parler’s then CEO John Matze went from “our content is moderated based off the FCC and the Supreme Court” to “posting pictures of your fecal matter in the comment section WILL NOT BE TOLERATED” in a matter of days.

Basically, it’s exactly what I wrote in my speed run article. These naive social media CEOs come in, thinking that the thing “missing” from social media is “free speech.” But they’re wrong. Even if you strongly believe in “free speech” (as I do), that doesn’t mean you want to allow crazy assholes screaming insults at guests in your house. You ask those people to leave, so that your guests can feel welcome. That doesn’t mean you’re against free speech, you’re just saying “go be a crazy asshole somewhere else.”

Every “free speech” CEO eventually realizes this in some form or another. In Musk’s somewhat selfish view of the world, he only seems to notice the concerns when it comes to himself. While he’s had no problem encouraging brigading and harassing of those he dislikes, when a random crazy person showed up near a car with his child in it, he insisted (falsely, as we now know) that it was an account on his website that put him in danger, and banned it.

But, of course, reporters are going to report on it, and in that frenzied state of “this is bad, must be stopped,” he immediately jumped to “well, anyone talking about that account must also be bad, and obviously should also be stopped.”

The “links to other social media” freakout was likely related to all of this as well. First people were linking to the ElonJet account on other social media (which Musk referred to — incorrectly — as “ban evasion”) and so he saw social media as a sneaky tool for getting around his paradise view of how Twitter should work. Also, while there’s no confirmation on this point from Twitter’s numbers, it sure feels like these other social media sites are getting a nice inflow of users giving up on (or at least decreasing their usage of) Twitter.

The biggest beneficiary (by far) seems to be Mastodon, so Musk could view this as a “kill two birds with one stone” move: trying to blunt Mastodon’s growth while also (in his mind) stopping people from visiting the “dangerous” ElonJet account on Mastodon. Except, of course, the opposite of that occurred, and he created a sort of Streisand Effect bump for Mastodon users:

Chart showing mastodon growth over the past week

See those bumps in new signups? Those are Elon bumps. Each time he does something crazy, more people sign up.

So, based on that, Elon quickly started banning reporters who he disliked and who were asking what he saw as sketchy questions, and then tried to retcon policies to justify those bans. First it was the nonsense about “assassination coordinates” and then it became about links to social media. Reporter Taylor Lorenz got accused of both. Elon first claimed that her account was suspended for doxing someone “previously” in her reporting (which is something Lorenz-haters have falsely insisted she did). But Twitter directly told Lorenz she was banned for a tweet showing her accounts on other sites:

This is how tyrants rule when they want to pretend they’re ruling by principles. Punish those who oppose you, and then retcon in some kind of policy later, which you insist is an “obviously” good policy, to justify the bans.

Of course, in the old days, when Twitter had a thoughtful trust & safety team, at least they’d make some effort to game out new policies. They’d discuss how those policies might lead to bad outcomes, or how they might be confusing, or how they might be abused. But Elon and friends have no time for that. They need to ban people who upset him, and come up with the policies to justify it later.

That’s how you end up with the stupidly broad “no doxing” policy and the even dumber “no other social media” policy — and only then do they discover the problems of the policies, and try to adjust them on the fly.

There are two other facts here worth noting, and both apply to a very typical pattern found in authoritarians taking over governments while preaching about how they’re “bringing freedom back.”

First, they often will lie about the oppression that they claim happened under the last regime. That’s absolutely been the case here. As the Twitter files actually showed, Twitter’s former regime was not a bunch of “woke radicals censoring conservatives.” They were a thoughtful group of people doing an impossible task with not nearly enough resources, time, or information. As such, sometimes they made mistakes. But on the whole they were trying to create reasonable policies. This is why all evidence, across multiple studies, showed that Twitter actually bent over backwards to not be biased against conservatives, but Trumpists still insisted it was “obvious” that they were moderating based on bias.

The usefulness for the people now in charge, though, is that they feel they have free rein to do what they (falsely) insisted the previous regime was doing. You see it among many Musk fans now (including some high profile ones who should know better *cough* Marc Andreessen *cough*), who are mocking anyone pointing out the nonsense justifications and hypocrisy of Musk’s new policies, which clearly violate his old stated plans for the site. The people justifying this say, mockingly, “oooooooh, look who’s suddenly supportive of free speech.” The more vile version of this is “oh, well how does it feel now that you’re on the other end?” The more direct version is just “well, you did it to us.”

Except all of that is bullshit. Because people talking about it aren’t screaming about “free speech,” so much as pointing out how Musk is going back on his word. A thoughtful commentator might realize that maybe there were good reasons for older decisions, and it wasn’t just “woke suppression of free speech.” But, instead, they justify their new actions based on it being okay because of the falsely believed cruelty of the previous regime.

Second, this is pretty common with “revolutionaries” promising freedom. When they discover that freedom also allows people to oppose the new leader, those “disloyal” to the new regime need to be put down and silenced. In their minds, they justify it, because the ends (“eventual freedom”) justify the means of getting there. So, yes, the king must kill the protestors, but it’s only because those protestors might ruin this finely planned journey to more freedom.

So, in the mind of the despot who wants to believe they’re bringing a “better world of freedom” to the public, it’s okay to deny that freedom to the agitators and troublemakers, because they’re the ones “standing in the way” of freedom to the wider populace.

It seems like some of both of those factors are showing up here.

Filed Under: assassination coordinates, autocrats, content moderation, dictators, doxing, elon musk, justification, social media
Companies: twitter

Adblock test (Why?)

Explained: A year for the ‘woman’, why Dictionary.com declared it as 2022 Word of the Year - Republic World - Dictionary

After much anticipation and deliberation, Dictionary.com declared ‘woman’ as the Word of the Year for 2022 on December 13. Defending their choice, the website said that it is “a word that is inseparable from the story of 2022”. The searches for the word, especially in the months of February and March, increased by more than 1,400% which was unusual for a regular vocable. The amount of times ‘woman’ was searched in 2022 was double the routine search volume for the word in previous years. 

“Our selection of ‘woman’ as our 2022 Word of the Year reflects how the intersection of gender, identity, and language dominates the current cultural conversation and shapes much of our work as a dictionary,” said the online dictionary’s website. The biggest search spike for the word on the website was reported at the end of March during the confirmation hearing for United States Judge Kentanji Brown Jackson where she was asked by Republican party Senator Marsha Blackburn to provide a definition for the word ‘woman’. Jackson was later confirmed as the first Black woman to be confirmed as a US Supreme Court justice.

How does one define the word ‘woman’?

The question came at the forefront numerous times this year. It was prominent during the international discourse regarding issues of transgender and personal identity. The main question faced was who gets to identify as a woman. In 2020, the Oxford English Dictionary updated its definition of the word 'woman' following complaints that the definition was “sexist”. The earlier definition in the Oxford English Dictionary included the phrase, "a man's wife, girlfriend or lover." The dictionary rephrased this part of the definition to, “a person’s wife, girlfriend or female lover”.

The Cambridge Dictionary has updated its definition of the word "woman" in a bid to make it more inclusive. The new definition will include anyone who "identifies as female," regardless of their sex at birth. The change is aimed at reflecting a definition that is more in keeping with the times. The definition of woman will not only include an "adult female human being," but also a woman who can be, "an adult who lives and identifies as female though they may have been said to have a different sex at birth.”

Dictionary.com said that the word woman was “a prime example of the many gender terms undergoing shifts in how and to whom they’re applied.” Our entries for woman and the inextricably-linked word 'female' do this by accounting for the many facets of such terms—biological, personal, and linguistic, the website said. “But the dictionary is not the last word on what defines a woman. The word belongs to each and every woman—however they define themselves,” the website added.

Instances in 2022 where women or the word ‘woman’ has been prominent

In May, a leak revealed the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn Roe v. Wade, and lookups for ‘woman’ surged again, reported the website. In September, the death of Queen Elizabeth II captured the world’s attention in a way that few other things do, prompting discussion and debate about the life and the legacy of the woman who became one of the world’s longest reigning monarchs. In Iran, a 22-year-old woman, Mahsa Amini, died in the custody of the government’s so-called morality police, sparking outrage and a protest movement that has been primarily led by women, who are demanding greater freedom and autonomy.

The year was full of notable stories in women’s sports, including superstar Serena Williams’ announcement that she will be “evolving away from tennis”; ongoing debates about transgender athletes; the equal pay settlement reached by the US Women’s National Soccer Team; and WNBA star Brittney Griner’s internationally condemned imprisonment by Russia and her subsequent release.

What were the other words (terms) shortlisted by Dictionary.com for 2022 Word of the Year?

The shortlisted words for 2022 by the Dictionary.com reflected the mood of a year surrounded by “significant events and trends” taking place ranging from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the online Wordle wave on Twitter. Five terms other than ‘woman’ were shortlisted for ‘Word of the Year’. The following were the other five shortlisted terms:

Ukraine Flag Emoji

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February this year enveloped the entire globe in a sense of alarm forcing nations worldwide to take a stand on the war. Reports of countless tragedies including a refugee crisis along with a serious loss to human life and infrastructure, soon surfaced and received widespread condemnation from countries and international organisations alike. One way to show solidarity with the Ukrainian people has been the use of the Ukraine flag in peoples’ social media bios and cover photos/banners. Many other terms related to the still ongoing war in Ukraine like ‘oligarch’ and ‘sanction’ were also some of the year’s top searches, said the website. 

Inflation

As the world barely commences to get back up from the crippling effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the word ‘inflation’ has reigned supreme in financial circles across the planet. It has become a hot topic for discussion and debate while almost everyone is gearing for its hard-hitting effects. Terms related to inflation like ‘hyperinflation’, ‘superinflation’, ‘shadow inflation’ and others are expected to continue being searched in the future as well. 

Quiet quitting

All of us saw a major paradigm shift related to work culture during the pandemic with employees working remotely or ‘working from home’. Many deliberations on the best way to produce efficiency at work during the pandemic led to many work-related terms entering our lexicon. One term that stood out was ‘quite quitting’, which refers to the practice of doing the minimum required to get a job done and not putting in more time and effort than absolutely necessary. 

Democracy

The word ‘democracy’ was amongst the top 50 searches in the entire year, according to Dictionary.com. The term has been especially active as its meaning has been debated time and again as governments across the world shift ideologies and go through various election processes. The discussion has mostly been around the subject of its precariousness. 

Wordle

Nobody could have thought that a simple word challenge game which occupies an average of only two to five minutes’ time of the user every day, would literally bring everyone together. The name of the game ‘Wordle’ has been added to the website, Dictionary.com stated. The 2022 Word of the Year - ‘woman’ is also a five-letter word, fitting the working of the popular online game.

Adblock test (Why?)

Timekettle to showcase HybridComm Translation Technology - MarTech Series - Translation

Timekettle to showcase HybridComm Translation Technology

Adblock test (Why?)

Definitions of 'man' and 'woman' updated, now include transgender - Africanews English - Dictionary

The Cambridge Dictionary recently updated its entries for “man” and “woman” to include transgender people.

The updates went into effect in October but appear to have gained some attention in December when the dictionary’s expanded definition of “woman” garnered backlash from conservative commentators on social media, a spokesperson for the Cambridge Dictionary told CNN.

While the Cambridge Dictionary’s primary definition for “woman” remains “an adult female human being,” a second definition refers to “an adult who lives and identifies as female though they may have been said to have a different sex at birth.”

Example sentences provided by the dictionary include “Mary is a woman who was assigned male at birth” and “Their doctor encouraged them to live as a man for a while before undergoing surgical transition.”

Africanews checks from the Cambridge dictionary showed that the original definition at the entry for woman remains unchanged and continues to be ‘an adult female human being’.

Dictionary.com announced “woman” as its 2022 word of the year, citing how “the very matter of the definition of the word ‘woman’ was at the centre of so many consequential moments, discussions, and decisions in our society.”

Despite the outcry deeming Cambridge Dictionary’s new definitions to be a political statement, the spokesperson said that such changes are meant to provide an accurate depiction of how certain words are used in society.

In 2020, Merriam-Webster expanded its definition of “female” to include “having a gender identity that is the opposite of male” – that change also drew criticism from conservatives, though a similar addition was made to the word “male.” The year before, Merriam-Webster added a new definition to the pronoun “they” to refer to a single person whose gender identity is nonbinary.

Adblock test (Why?)